Introduction
Far from being conquered by public health, vaccines, and antibiotics, infectious diseases continue to threaten humankind globally. There is a rich contemporary literature regarding the burden of endemic disease and epidemics of age-old threats, the emergence of newly discovered pathogens, drug resistance and the phenomenon of reemerging microbial threats. [1] [2] [3] In addition, biological terrorism remains a clear and present danger. 4 Beyond the personal impact on individuals suffering from infection, disease has societal impact: it can destabilize social institutions, populations, economies, and governments. For this reason, infectious disease is both a national and an international security issue. 5, 6 The prevention and control of infectious diseases is therefore of extreme importance. World mobility rose significantly throughout the twentieth century and it continues to increase. Relative to past decades, people are traveling more, and travel times are dramatically shorter; at present it is possible to circumnavigate the globe in 36 h through regularly scheduled commercial flights. 2 More people, living species, and agricultural commodities are crossing borders than ever before, increasing the likelihood that pathogens circulating in one area will be translocated to another area. One of the consequences of such global mobility is that disease prevention in any one area often depends on the effectiveness of surveillance, communication, and response control in other areas. 7 Early warning of outbreaks may enable targeted quick intervention and control activities to take place. This was a motivation behind the 2005 revisions of the International Health Regulations (IHR). 8, 9 The IHR-2005 provide an international legal framework for the early detection and reporting of, and response to, outbreaks of infectious disease. WHO member nations are obligated to develop and maintain surveillance, reporting, notification, verification, and response capabilities. Any nation with knowledge of a disease outbreak of international concern is obligated to report it to the WHO within 24 h. The IHR-2005 are designed to ensure timely recognition of disease outbreaks of international public health significance and to promote effective containment before they spread. Historically, many epidemics have been reported through informal networks of health workers. Such networks should be timely, to assist in rapid detection, and sensitive, to detect potentially important outbreaks. As such, they may differ from traditional public health surveillance alluded to in the IHR, which often rely on classical epidemiologic studies or clinical or laboratory data, the availability of which often lag the events they describe by days or months. This approach can also be less specific than traditional public health surveillance, although such trade-offs may be appropriate for a network designed to provide early warning.
Surveillance has been enhanced by the development of several novel approaches complementing traditional methods. 10 Event-based biosurveillance is a new scientific discipline that uses information from the Internet whereby diverse streams of data are characterized prospectively to provide information on events affecting human health.
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Indicator-based systems rely on routine collection of structured data such as syndromic surveillance and clinical activity monitoring, whereas these new event-based systems use unstructured data from media and other sources to detect anomalies that may indicate an emerging threat.
The potential of biosurveillance to contribute to global early warning of infectious disease and related threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents, is becoming recognized. 12 Researchers have developed prototype Internet-based systems to monitor and track the emergence of infectious disease and to evaluate the degree to which biosurveillance can provide early warning of outbreaks. 13 Founded in 2001, the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal international partnership to strengthen health preparedness and response globally to CBRN terrorism threats and pandemic influenza. 14 15 The RMCWG is currently making preliminary assessments of the opportunities, with a focus on bioterrorism and diseases threatening public health. A follow-up meeting in Ispra, Italy explored in detail the tasks of each proposed work package in preparation for the Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the GHSI in Brussels, Belgium in early December 2008. In 2007-2008, the GHSAG made progress addressing key risks to global health security. This was accomplished through a variety of technical, scientific and policy networks and initiatives, and stemmed from collective efforts and approaches in areas such as prevention, research, preparedness, and response. In combination, the GHSAG event-based surveillance systems, which use the media as the primary source of information, form a unique part of the landscape of international biosurveillance.
Methods
This review covers GHSAG-member biosurveillance systems, which constitute a major (although incomplete) fraction of similar capabilities available to the public health community at present. We elicited basic information from the respective system investigators to compare and contrast system capabilities and to illustrate the complementarities of the different approaches to event-based biosurveillance. Each biosurveillance system described in this study has been approved by institutional review board or corresponding authority at the respective institutions housing the systems.
Systems
Several systems originating from GHSAG member nations with a focus on biosurveillance or situation awareness are known at present and are described in this section. Table 1 provides a brief comparison of system traits and capabilities. The systems are listed alphabetically; no ranking should be inferred from the order of presentation.
Argus
Project Argus is a prototype biosurveillance system designed to detect and track biological events that may threaten human, plant, and animal health globally. 16 The approach is based on monitoring social disruption evident in local, native-language media reports around the world. Argus uses analysts speaking approximately 40 languages to monitor a large number of media sources including traditional print and electronic media, Internet-based newsletters, and blogs. It alerts users to events that may signal the initiation of outbreaks and shows trajectories of events that may require additional investigation. Bayesian analysis tools are used for article selection and alerting.
International 
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Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases ProMED (http://www.promedmail.org) was established in 1994 and currently operates as a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases with contributing corporate, foundation, and individual donor support. 26, 27 It is an unautomated, human-driven process, where more than 40,000 freely subscribed members in more than 160 countries submit reports of disease. The majority of these reports are media articles. Other sources include local observers, official reports, and others. All reporting is screened by subject matter experts before posting (approximately seven reports issued per day). A total of 50,000 reports have been posted since project inception in the mid 1990s (10,000 of which are veterinary disease reports). ProMED has approximately 30 staff member subject matter experts, five regional programs, and staff in 15 countries. Regional programs of ProMED include Latin America, the Mekong Basin, the East Africa Integrated Disease Surveillance Network, and ProMED-RUS (former Soviet Union). ProMED-mail is available in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russian languages. Future objectives include French language reporting.
Pattern-based Understanding and Learning System PULS (http://puls.cs.helsinki.fi/medical/) is a project at the University of Helsinki, in collaboration with the European Commission's MedISys, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). PULS traces its origins to the IFE-BIO Project, which aimed to analyze events reported in ProMED-mail. 28 As ProMED-mail, PULS tracks human, animal, and plant diseases, currently covering more than 1500 base terms, with 2500 variants. The focus in PULS is on the analysis of news texts for information extraction, aggregation, and visualization. PULS is fully automated with no human intervention. It uses MedISys as its main source, and uses natural language processing methods for analyzing the news stream to build a database of facts about the epidemiological events. The output of PULS is a spreadsheetlike view of the fact base, which is updated every 20 min. The base is also Google Earth-enabled. Linguistic coverage is primarily English, with a recent introduction of French language analysis. The PULS average daily extraction rate varies from 300 entries during 'normal' periods to more than 1000 per day during times of heightened reporting, totaling about 300,000 entries to date. Future objectives include stronger multilingual support (with the addition of Spanish, Russian, and Chinese), trend analysis, and data visualization.
Discussion
Event-based biosurveillance possesses strengths and limitations that make it complementary to other experimental as well as traditional public health surveillance. Such systems may not always be timely, they may have limited specificity, and baseline thresholds for indicator detection may be difficult to quantify. Although the systems described above are representative of the rapidly changing state of the art in event-based biosurveillance, important technological and methodological challenges remain. 29 Prominent challenges include interoperability, interface customizability, scalability, and event traceability. Integration of geospatial visualization, event mapping, modeling and trending tools are important for establishing metrics and baselines necessary for data interpretation and analysis. In addition, expansion of the current biosurveillance capability by incorporation of emerging media such as video, audio, images, blogs, social networking sites, SMS (short message service) and others may be important. Although some qualitative aspects of recognizing important public health threats using event-based surveillance are evident, the value of diverse data sources must be quantified. Given the diversity and richness of the Internet, and the availability of data and information from other sources (for example, traditional public health, syndromic, and laboratory surveillance) of varying degrees of confidence and geographic coverage, how to quantify the payoff of including different sources in biosurveillance systems is unclear. Quantifying variation in source reporting standards as well as catchment (that is, the regions from which a source collects data) and target population will be important for understanding the validity of biosurveillance system output. Metrics must be defined, and these metrics need to be generalizable across systems using different data and different approaches to analysis.
Standard guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems may not be wholly appropriate for evaluating event-based biosurveillance systems. 30 Techniques for evaluating system performance are needed and standardized metrics quantifying the performance of distinct biosurveillance systems must be developed. Such metrics are also needed if end users are to be able to understand the performance of a given system, or an aggregation of systems. Similarly, analytic methods for assessing and quantifying the value added by biosurveillance to other approaches to surveillance and situational awareness must be developed.
Efficient and meaningful ways of communicating complex biosurveillance data must be identified. Because they are tailored to meet the needs of the specific user communities, current systems show and present the results of biosurveillance differently. How to best present results to the broader user community, which includes researchers as well as public health workers and decision makers, is unclear. Many unknowns remain, including identifying the most appropriate interactive visual interfaces; best practices regarding techniques for synthesizing biosurveillance data visually; and how to present dynamic, ambiguous, and potentially conflicting information to consumers of biosurveillance.
Real-time situational awareness of emerging biological threats is needed in today's dynamic world. However, if such an approach to public health response is to be viable, a capability must exist to detect evidence of outbreak activity at the earliest stages and monitor related information as it evolves. We are unaware of published studies investigating the timeliness of event-based biosurveillance using Internet sources relative to traditional approaches to public health surveillance. To maximize the likelihood of early detection, such a capability should be composed of discrete components acting in concert. At one end of the alerting spectrum, biosurveillance systems that provide indications and warning (I&W) of potential infectious disease events are needed. These I&W components would provide the first tip of a potential event or risk of a future event. Necessarily, information provided by systems at this end of the spectrum would have limited confidence and their output would need to be refined and better characterized by other components in the alerting spectrum. Toward the middle of the spectrum would be systems that more directly measure infectious disease activity, for example, syndromic surveillance systems. At the opposite end of the spectrum would be traditional formal clinical and laboratory-based public health surveillance.
At the biosurveillance end of the spectrum, there is considerable variation in system capability, data analyzed, and products disseminated, pointing to the need for integration. A meeting of GHSAG participants (Luxembourg, 2008) highlighted the need for 'cooperation at all levels, between systems, between systems and users, and users amongst themselves. Such cooperation should be considered at the level of the collection of data, at the level of data analysis of the data available and the subsequent sharing of the relevant information through a common restricted platform.' 31 Although such a capability does not yet exist, similarities and differences among the systems described above suggest that combining these approaches into a single system can provide a powerful biosurveillance resource. The GHSAG is developing such a prototype biosurveillance 'system of systems'; it is anticipated that, with appropriate communication and data sharing protocols, technical barriers to integrating existing global and regional biosurveillance systems can be overcome. It is possible partially because each of the individual systems examined here has different missions and approaches, and complement one another. This complementarity will be shown in the GHSAG pilot integration project.
